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Peremptory Challenges in Transition
I. Introduction
A defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury is recog-
nized as fundamental to the American scheme of justice.1 The
role peremptory challenges can play in the jury selection process
to undermine that right is less recognized. Peremptory chal-
lenges are used to eliminate potential jurors in the final stage of
selection of a jury panel.' In Swain v. Alabama,3 the United
States Supreme Court characterized the nature of a peremptory
challenge4 as "one exercised without a reason stated, without in-
quiry and without being subject to the court's control."' 5 In
Swain, the Court held that under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment there was no constitutional impedi-
ment to the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to ex-
clude all blacks from a jury in a particular case.' The Court indi-
1. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-58 (1968) (historical devel-
opment of the sixth amendment guarantees).
2. There are three main stages in jury selection. First a master list of eligible jurors
is compiled. Second the venire panel or pool from which the jury is selected is created.
At this stage jurors are excused or disqualified by the judge on grounds of incompetency
or undue hardship. The third stage is the challenge stage in which jurors are eliminated
both for cause and peremptorily. The first and second stages relate to jurors' qualifica-
tions to serve in any case. The third stage relates to jurors' qualifications to serve in a
particular case.
3. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
4. There are two systems of peremptory challenges. One is the common law system
which simply allows counsel to eliminate undesired jurors. The second is the struck jury
system. Under this system, the entire venire is assembled and questioned. Then each
side alternately strikes jurors until the required number remains. Id. at 216.
5. Id. at 220. Citing earlier cases, Justice White emphasized the difference between
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. "While challenges for cause permit re-
jection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partial-
ity, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily
designated or demonstrable." Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (defining "peremp-
tory challenge" as an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given, but upon
which the court must exclude him); id. § 1071 (defining "challenge for cause" as an ob-
jection to a particular juror that is either general when the juror is disqualified from
serving in any case or particular when he is disqualified from serving in the action on
trial because he will not be impartial).
6. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
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cated that, regardless of the circumstances, peremptory
challenges would be subject to judicial scrutiny only if system-
atic exclusion of blacks could be shown in case after case.7
Swain established an almost insurmountable burden for
overcoming the presumption that in any particular case the
prosecution is using its peremptory challenges to obtain a fair
and impartial jury.8 In fact, only two defendants have success-
fully challenged misuse of peremptory challenges under the
Swain rule.9 During the nineteen years since Swain, systematic
exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of group bias has come
under increasing attack by both commentators 0 and judges.1"
7. Id. at 222-23.
8. Specifically, the Court stated:
The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the
State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the
court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor is therefore not sub-
jected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were
removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes.
Id. at 222.
9. In United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 744 (1984), the dismal record under the Swain rule was reviewed. The court found
that defendants had been successful in only two cases, and that both cases had used the
same statistics regarding a particular prosecutor in a Louisiana parish. Id. at 1316. See
State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La.
1979).
10. See, e.g., Brown, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Crim-
inal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192 (1978) (arguing that
grant of peremptory challenges to prosecutors should be rescinded unless courts can pre-
vent abuse); Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant
and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REv. 448 (1966) (comparing Swain to the more "real-
istic" approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Chal-
lenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and A Constitutional Analysis,
81 MICH. L. REv. (1982) (focusing on the consequences of Swain in creating juries signifi-
cantly more prone to convict in captial cases); Note, Peremptory Chal-
lenge - Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J.
157 (1967) (arguing Swain set an insurmountable burden of proof for the defendant);
Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86
YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) (favoring extension of Taylor representative cross-section require-
ment to peremptory challenge stage); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Chal-
lenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662
(1974) (case study showing difficulty of meeting Swain burden of proof); Comment,
Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White
Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966) (arguing Swain gives greater deference to peremptory
challenges than to constitutional considerations); Recent Development, Racial Discrimi-
nation in Jury Selection, 41 ALB. L. REv. 623 (1977) (favoring extension of Taylor cross-
sectional requirement).
11. See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Nickerson, J.);
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These critics argue that Swain is in conflict with the sixth
amendment" and must be modified or overruled. California,
Massachusetts, and most recently Florida, have examined the
Swain rule and have established different standards for the use
of peremptory challenges." These states now permit a defendant
to question the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in an
individual case rather than requiring a showing of systematic ex-
clusion in case after case. Even more significant, some justices of
the United States Supreme Court are indicating a willingness to
reexamine the Swain rule while other justices are encouraging
more state experimentation before the issue is addressed by the
Court."
People v. Payne, 99 II. 2d 135, 155, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1212 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting);
People v. Gosberry, 449 N.E.2d 815, 816 (Ill. 1983) (Simon, J., dissenting); State v.
Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361, 1370-72 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., concurring); People v. McCray,
57 N.Y.2d 542, 551, 443 N.E.2d 915, 920, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 446 (1982) (Meyer, J., dis-
senting); id. at 556, 443 N.E.2d at 923, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting);
People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981); Commonwealth v. Martin,
461 Pa. 289, 336 A.2d 290, 295 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text.
12. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (emphasis added).
13. Although basing their decisions on state constitutional grounds, California and
Massachusetts have effectively rejected Swain. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387
N.E. 2d 499 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). For further discussion, see infra
notes 53-68 and accompanying text. In September, 1984 the Florida Supreme Court
joined Massachusetts and California in ruling an alternative to Swain was needed to
prevent peremptory challenges from being used solely as a scalpel to excise a distinct
racial group. The court restricted its holding to racial bias, leaving consideration of other
distinctive groups to be determined as those cases arise. State v. Neil, 53 U.S.L.W. 2200
(Fla. Sept. 27, 1984) (No. 63-899). The only other state that has endorsed any modifica-
tion of Swain is New Mexico. In New Mexico, an appellate court applied both the Swain
and the Wheeler/Soares test but did not find the defendant's burden satisfied under
either standard. See State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1981). See
also State v. Davis, 99 N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 578, 661 P.2d 478
(1983).
14. See McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983) (mem.), denying cert. to People
v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982); State v. Perry, 420
So. 2d 139 (La. 1982); People v. Miller, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1205, 437 N.E.2d 945 (1982).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, invited the states "to serve as
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this
Court." Id. at 2439.
Justices Marshall and Brennan urged the Court to grant certiorari now to reexamine
the Swain rule, or to determine whether the sixth and fourteenth amendments prohibit
3
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The Swain rule should be modified because it insulates in-
vidious discrimination from review and works to defeat the goal
of providing an impartial jury. If individual states choose to ex-
periment with peremptory challenges, however, they must face
the procedural and substantive problems involved in any altera-
tion of the Swain rule. These problems must be satisfactorily
resolved if new standards are to work fairly and effectively.
This Comment examines the problems involved in modify-
ing the Swain rule. Part II briefly examines the historical devel-
opment of peremptory challenges, the developments under the
sixth amendment, the California and Massachusetts tests, and
the recent developments in the Supreme Court. Part III analyzes
the emerging case law in California and Massachusetts, the two
states that have been operating under the new test for several
years. The Comment concludes that these state standards are
flexible and workable, and most important, that they better en-
sure that discriminatory abuse does not go unchecked.
II. Background
A. Evolution of Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges have their roots in English common
law and thus have "very old credentials." 15 The use of peremp-
tory challenges, however, has been neither consistent nor popu-
lar, particularly when challenges by prosecutors are involved. As
a result, the system has been subject to debate and modification
since 1305.16
the states from excluding jurors on the basis of race. Id. at 2441-43 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing from denial of cert.). Justice Marshall reiterated his position in October 1983, and
again in May and June of 1984. See Gilliard v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 40, 41 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Williams v. Illinois, 104 S.Ct. 2364, 2366
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Harris v. Texas, 104 S. Ct. 3556,
3557 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). For a discussion of McCray,
see infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
15. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
16. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 147-51 (1977). In the earliest
jury trials for felonies, the Crown had an unlimited number of peremptory challenges
while a defendant had 35. See L. MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIB-
ERTY 56 (1973). In 1305, the Crown's unlimited right was abolished under a statute re-
quiring cause to be given for the exclusion of jurors. 33 Edw. 4 (1305). Parliament had
decided that a jury biased toward the prosecution was not impartial and "was obnoxious
to their idea of justice." J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 147. The statute was undermined, how-
[Vol. 5:185
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At common law the peremptory challenge was recognized as
a device to protect the defendant. In his Commentaries, Black-
stone called the peremptory challenge "a provision full of that
tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English
laws are justly famous."17 The colonists brought the English jury
tradition, including the defendant's right to exercise peremptory
challenges, with them when they came to America. 18 The use of
peremptory challenges in England subsequently declined, and
today it is rarely used by either the prosecution or the defense.'9
In contrast to the development of peremptory challenges in
England, peremptory challenges remain widely used in the
United States.20 Congress provided peremptory challenges for
defendants in federal courts in the Act of 1790.21 The use of
peremptory challenges by the prosecution, however, remained
"more controversial, and substantial popular protest was raised
against it."'2 ' Until 1856, the federal courts 'allowed challenges by
a prosecutor, but in that year the Supreme Court held that the
Act of 1790, which afforded a defendant a right of challenge, did
not include the government's right to request potential jurors to
ever, by a judge-made rule that the Crown was permitted to ask potential jurors to
"stand aside" until the panel was exhausted. There was an assumption that cause existed
whenever a juror was asked to stand aside. See VAN DYKE, supra, at 147-48.
17. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353, quoted with approval in Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). There were two reasons for the use of peremptory chal-
lenges. First, it was felt that a defendant on trial for his life should be able to have a
"good opinion of his jury" unfettered by any lingering doubts about possible prejudice
toward him, even if no concrete reason could be stated for this doubt. Second, there was
a concern that, simply from the process of asking probing questions during the voir dire,
some resentment might arise toward the defendant. Id.
18. Defendants in Virginia, for example, were allowed 20 peremptory challenges
under a 1734 Virginia law, but the prosecutor was not permitted any challenges without
showing good cause. Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE
JuRY SYSTEM IN AME-CA 27 (R.J. Simon ed. 1975).
19. In England, if jurors are to be challenged, it must be before they are sworn.
Challenges are infrequently used because barristers lack information on which to base a
challenge, and because custom is strongly against challenge. L. MOORE, supra note 16, at
134. Moore also quotes an experienced barrister as saying, "In England, the trial begins
when the jury is picked; in the United States, the trial is over when the jury is picked."
Id.
20. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 218.
21. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1870 (1982)). See Swain, 380 U.S. at 214.
22. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 148.
19841
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"stand aside. ' 23  Nine years later, Congress granted federal
prosecutors five peremptory challenges; defendants were permit-
ted twenty challenges in capital and treason cases. 24 In other
cases, the prosecution was allowed two challenges and the de-
fense was allowed ten.2
Developments in the states paralleled the course in the fed-
eral system. The states enacted statutes that granted rights cor-
responding to the rights defendants had in England.26 During
the nineteenth century, the states also passed statutes allowing
the prosecution to exercise peremptory challenges, although
these statutes generally limited the prosecution's number of
challenges to one-half the number permitted the defendant.2 7
The fears of prosecutorial abuse, so prevalent during the Revo-
lutionary period, gradually yielded to an acceptance of the idea
that the states also had an interest in achieving an impartial
jury.28 Today, a majority of the states authorize an equal num-
ber of challenges for both prosecutors and defendants. Chal-
lenges are also typically allowed in civil cases.2
B. Swain v. Alabama - Insulating the Misuse of Peremptory
Challenges from Constitutional Attack
Granting prosecutors an equal number of peremptory chal-
lenges created a problem for black defendants. Prosecutors
could use peremptory challenges to systematically eliminate en-
tire races or other distinct groups from the jury. This practice,
which was widespread in the South, led to a major attack on
23. United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856). For an explanation
of the government's right to stand aside, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 147-48.
24. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 215.
27. Id. at 216.
28. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 150. In New York, for example, defendants were
allowed 20 peremptory challenges by statute in 1828, but the state had no challenges
until 1858 when they were granted five. It was not until 1873 that the same number was
allowed for each side. People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 98-99, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 748
(1981).
29. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 282-83 (chart showing breakdown of peremptory
challenges by state for criminal and civil cases). Peremptory challenges, however, have
never been constitutionally guaranteed. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 244.
[Vol. 5:185
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/6
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.80 In Swain, the
prosecution used six challenges to exclude all of the black ve-
niremen.3 1 Furthermore, the defendant argued that although an
average of six or seven blacks appeared on jury lists, no black
person had actually sat on a jury in a criminal case in Alabama
for twenty-four years.82 The Court held that no defendant may
challenge the removal of Negroes from any particular panel.83 In
any given case, there is a presumption that the prosecutor is us-
ing his challenges to achieve a fair and impartial jury." This
presumption can be overcome only if, in case after case, it is
demonstrated that the prosecution is eliminating venire mem-
bers on the basis of race. 85
Justices Goldberg and Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren
dissented, arguing that this rule would reverse constitutional
priorities by giving greater protection to the peremptory chal-
lenge than to the right to an impartial jury.8 Justice Goldberg
stated that the Court was, in effect, holding that "[t]here is
nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires
the State to grant trial by an impartial jury so long as the invio-
lability of the peremptory challenge is secured. 87 Justice
Goldberg's warning became a reality as defendants learned that
the Swain rule presented an almost insurmountable burden. 8
C. Taylor* v. Louisiana - Expanding Sixth Amendment
Rights
The petitioners in Swain claimed a denial of equal protec-
tion under the fourteenth amendment. In other cases, federal
courts were developing the contours of the sixth amendment
30. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). For almost a century after the Civil War, blacks were ex-
cluded from jury lists in the South. After years of litigation, they were included but then
eliminated by the peremptory challenges. See J. VAN Dvx, supra note 16, at 150.
31. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 222.
34. Id.
35. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222-23. The defendant's record in Swain, alleging that no
Negro had sat on a jury from 1950 to 1964, was found inadequate because it did not
prove whether the prosecutor alone was responsible. Id. at 224.
36. Id. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19841
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guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. These cases held that an
essential prerequisite to an impartial jury was that it be drawn
from a "representative cross-section of the community. s3  Then,
in 1968, the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana40 that
the sixth amendment's provision for a jury trial was binding on
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 41 This holding set
the stage for the Supreme Court's opinion in Taylor v. Louisi-
ana,42 which applied the representative cross-section require-
ment to the states.43
Taylor dealt with the exclusion of women from the venire or
panel from which a petit jury was chosen in Louisiana." The
Court found the representative cross-section requirement to be
fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment.45 In discussing the importance of a diffused impartiality
on the jury, the Court noted that the effect of excluding "any
large and identifiable segment of the community . . . is to re-
39. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Thiel v. Southern Pac. R.R., 328
U.S. 217 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); People v. Smith, 311 U.S.
128 (1940). For a discussion of these cases, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 54-63.
Judge Mosk, who wrote the California opinion in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583
P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1965), surveyed these decisions and found that
[t]he rationale of these decisions, often unstated, is that in our heterogeneous soci-
ety jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often overlapping groups defined
by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation, eco-
nomic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; that it is unrealistic to
expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases
derived from their life experiences in such groups; and hence that the only practi-
cal way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of a
variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their members,
to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out.
Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896 (footnote omitted).
40. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. Id. at 149. In Duncan, the Court stated that
because we believe that a trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which - were they to be tried in federal
court - would come within the Sixth Amendment's Guarantee.
Id.
42. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
43. Id. at 530.
44. Id. at 523. The Louisiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure both
provided that a woman would not be selected for jury service unless she had previously
filed a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service. Id. (citing LA.
CONST. art. VII, § 41; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 402 (West 1967)).
45. Id. at 530.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/6
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move from the jury room qualities of human nature and vari-
eties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable."'
Significantly, in Taylor, the Court confined its holding to
the composition of the venire and it did not extend its holding
to include the challenge stage of the jury selection process.' 7
Furthermore, the Court repeated its determination that the ac-
tual jury selected need not represent all groups in the
community."
D. The California and Massachusetts Tests - Peremptory
Challenges on a Case by Case Basis
In Taylor, the Supreme Court safeguarded the right to a
representative jury during the selection of venire members. Nev-
ertheless, these safeguards have been criticized as insufficient
protection. As Justice Marshall has stated: "The right to a jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is rendered
meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremp-
tory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury.' " More-
over, the desired interaction of diverse members of the commu-
nity takes place in the jury room, not in the venire.5 Thus,
commentators and judges have advocated either expansion of
the Taylor safeguards to cover the peremptory stage of jury se-
lection or modification of Swain." The state supreme courts of
California and Massachusetts have chosen to reject the almost
insurmountable Swain test, relying instead on the Taylor cross-
sectional requirement and their own state constitutions to for-
46. Id. at 532 n.12 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)).
47. Id. at 538. For a discussion of the stages of jury selection, see supra note 2.
48. The Court asserted:
We impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the com-
munity and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants
are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition ... but the... venires
from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in
the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.
Id. at 538.
49. McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2442 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).
50. Id.
51. See sources cited supra notes 10-11.
1984]
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mulate a case by case approach. 2
In People v. Wheeler,5 8 the California Supreme Court an-
nounced a test that limits the unrestricted use of peremptory
challenges. In Wheeler, the prosecutor had used his peremptory
challenges to exclude all blacks from the jury. 4 This new test
begins with a rebuttable presumption that peremptory chal-
lenges are being constitutionally exercised. 5 Writing for the
court, Judge Mosk distinguished the many valid uses of peremp-
tory challenges for specific bias5s from the situation in which po-
tential jurors are eliminated merely because they are members
of an identifiable group distinguishable on the basis of racial,
religious, ethnic, or other similar grounds.57 Thus, under normal
circumstances, there would be no change in the traditional pro-
cedure. If, however, a party believes the challenges are being
used on the basis of group bias alone, he must then raise the
52. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 903 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Florida has also now rejected Swain. See supra note
13.
53. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
54. Id. at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
55. Id. at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
56. "Specific bias" was defined by Judge Mosk as a bias concerning the particular
case on trial or the parties or witnesses involved. For example, a particular juror might
be excused because he was exposed to pretrial publicity. Id. at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 901.
57. Id. Judge Mosk also indicated that, although no reason need be given for a pe-
remptory challenge, it does not follow that no reason need exist. On the contrary, he
maintained that, given the limited number of peremptory challenges available, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that they would be exercised frivolously. Id. Therefore, the presumption
exists that the challenge is used to remove a juror who may consciously or unconsciously
be biased against a party. This presumed bias may be based on the fact that the juror
has a record of prior arrests, or has complained of police harassment, or has clothes that
suggest an unconventional lifestyle. The prosecutor may merely mistrust a juror's objec-
tivity because of "bare looks." Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (quot-
ing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *353). These kinds of reasons cannot be estab-
lished by normal methods of proof and may cause embarrassment to the challenged
vernireman. Therefore, the law does not require that a reason be given. These uses of the
peremptory challenge all share a common element: "[T]hey seek to eliminate a specific
bias as we have defined that term herein - a bias relating to the particular case on trial
or the parties or witnesses thereto." Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
Judge Mosk indicated that these reasons also are neutral with respect to the representa-
tion on the jury and do not, therefore, fundamentally alter the population mix on the
jury. All members of society can have these biases whether black or white, rich or poor,
young or old. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/6
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point in a timely fashion and establish a prima facie case." To
establish a prima facie case, the court indicated that a party sus-
pecting bias should do the following:
First, . . .he should make as complete a record of the circum-
stances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons
excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning
of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the cir-
cumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that
such persons are being challenged because of their group associa-
tion rather than because of any specific bias."
Judge Mosk rejected mathematical or statistical methods 0
to show systematic exclusion, because he felt such methods
would be of little help during voir dire when the composition of
the jury is constantly changing.61 He did, however, indicate
other factors that might be significant to prove discrimination
because of group association. These factors include a showing
that: (1) the party had struck most or all of the members of an
identified group, or used a disproportionate number of his pe-
remptory challenges against the group; (2) the struck jurors were
in all other respects a heterogeneous group; (3) the voir dire was
only desultory or no questions were asked at all; and (4) the de-
fendant was a member of the excluded group although the vic-
tim was a member of the majority.2
In Commonwealth v. Soares," the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts followed Wheeler closely. The court's analysis
also begins with the rebuttable presumption that peremptory
challenges are being properly used." The presumption is rebut-
ted "on a showing that (1) a pattern of conduct has developed
whereby several prospective jurors who have been challenged pe-
remptorily are members of a discrete group, and (2) there is a
likelihood they are being excluded from the jury solely by reason
of their group membership."65
58. Id. at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 279, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
61. Id. at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
62. Id.
63. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
64. Id. at 489, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17.
65. Id. at 489-90, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
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At this point, both Wheeler and Soares require the trial
judge to decide if a prima facie case has been established. 6 Once
a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the other
party to show that the peremptory challenges were not made on
the basis of group bias alone.6 7 Neither state requires that the
reason for a peremptory challenge rise to the level of a challenge
for cause, but the peremptory challenge must be based upon
grounds reasonably relevant to the particular case at trial.68
E. United States Supreme Court Invites Change
The Supreme Court has thus far refused to review the
Swain decision. For example, the Court denied certiorari to Mc-
Cray v. New York,69 a case alleging abuse of peremptory chal-
lenges. A majority of five justices, however, did agree that exclu-
sion of minority jurors through peremptory challenges was an
important constitutional issue.70 In spite of this acknowledge-
ment, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell,
chose to delay a decision and instead invited the state and fed-
eral courts to consider change on their own.1 Justice Stevens
maintained that this approach would enable the Supreme Court
to address the issue more effectively at a later date. 2 He noted,
without comment, the different standard adopted by California
and Massachusetts, indicating only that those standards could
not be reviewed by the Supreme Court because they were based
upon state constitutional grounds. 3
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, strongly dis-
sented in McCray.4 In addition, Marshall has spoken out in
66. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Soares, 377
Mass. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
67. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Soares, 377
Mass. at 491, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
68. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Soares, 377
Mass. at 491, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
69. 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983) (mem.) denying cert. to People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542,
443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982); State v. Perry, 420 So. 2d 139 (La. 1982);
People v. Miller, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1205, 437 N.E.2d 945 (1982).
70. The five are Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackman, Powell, and Stevens.
71. Id. at 2438-39 (Stevens, J.).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2439-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
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three subsequent dissents in the past year.75 He has termed the
misuse of peremptory challenges "one of the gravest and most
persistent problems facing the American judiciary today. 76 In
McCray, Justice Marshall urged the Court to grant certiorari to
reexamine Swain in light of Taylor and the expansion of sixth
amendment principles." Justice Marshall stated that
[t]he systematic exclusion of prospective jurors because of their
race is ... unconstitutional at any stage of the jury selection pro-
cess. There is no point in taking elaborate steps to ensure that
Negroes are included on venires simply so that they can be struck
because of their race by a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges.
7'
In sum, McCray indicates an increased willingness on the
75. In Gilliard v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 40, 40 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.), for example, he argued that the other justices were shrinking from their
constitutional duty, and observed that while the Supreme Court is awaiting develop-
ments in state courts, black defendants are facing death penalties from all-white juries.
He also argued that the states have not and will not deviate from the Swain rule until
the Supreme Court addresses the issue. See also Williams v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct. 2364,
2364-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.), reh'g denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3918
(1984); Harris v. Texas, 104 S. Ct. 3556, 3556-58 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).
76. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2366 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
77. McCray, 103 S. Ct. at 2441 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
78. Id. at 2442. The McCray facts may be reviewed again by the Supreme Court in
the near future. After the denial of certiorari, McCray filed a petition for a writ of
habeus corpus in federal district court. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). When Judge Nickerson heard the case, he sent "shock waves into the criminal
justice system" with his decision to accept Justice Steven's invitation and to modify the
Swain rule. See Cohn & Badillo, The McCray Case - 2 Views On Peremptory Chal-
lenges, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
Judge Nickerson admitted that he was taking a most unusual step in reexamining a
Supreme Court case squarely on point. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1246
(E.D.NY. 1983). He also admitted that the Court's invitation to reconsider Swain may
not have been intended to encourage a collateral attack on the very same conviction. He
noted, however, that Justice Stevens had pointed to the lack of conflict in the federal
courts as a reason for denying certiorari. Id. Judge Nickerson's decision has created a
conflict. Judge Nickerson concluded that Swain should be modified. Id. at 1249. He
maintained that the validity of Swain's assumptions regarding federally guaranteed
rights had been altered by the sixth amendment cases. Id. at 1247. Although agreeing
that a defendant is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, he argued that
peremptory challenges should not be permitted "solely on the basis of an assumption of
racial affinity in order to produce an all-white jury." Id. at 1248. He found this unconsti-
tutional under the equal protection clause as well as under the sixth amendment because
"no compelling governmental purpose justifies a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges solely on the basis of race." Id.
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part of the Supreme Court to reconsider the Swain ban on chal-
lenges to the misuse of peremptory challenges in individual
cases. The Supreme Court will be closely watching developments
at the state level for guidance. The success of state courts in
addressing the substantive and procedural problems which arise
will likely determine the law governing peremptory challenges.
III. Analysis
A majority of the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the arguments against Swain raise an important con-
stitutional issue: whether the Constitution prohibits the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group
from a jury, based on the prosecutor's assumption that they will
be biased in favor of other members of the same group.7 9 The
Court should not postpone addressing this constitutional issue
until the states provide further guidance because sufficient theo-
retical and practical information is available now. The theoreti-
cal arguments favoring extension of the representative cross-sec-
tion rule to the peremptory challenge area have been analyzed
by numerous commentators and judges and need no further dis-
cussion here.80
The practical considerations can be evaluated by examining
the emerging case law in California and Massachusetts. A review
of these cases rebuts the arguments of critics who believe that
any deviation from Swain will mean, at worst, the end of all
peremptory challenges, or at best, an ambiguous, impractical,
and easily subverted test. Both California and Massachusetts
begin with the presumption that peremptory challenges are be-
ing properly used." To object successfully to the misuse of per-
emptory challenges in a single case, the objecting party must es-
tablish a prima facie case of peremptory abuse. If a prima facie
case is established, an opportunity is then afforded the peremp-
tory challenger to rebut the prima facie case.
79. McCray v. New York, 103 S.Ct. 2438 (1983).
80. See sources cited supra notes 10-11.
81. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case
The most common concern expressed by critics of change is
that abandoning Swain will mean the end of peremptory chal-
lenges, that is, that all challenges will become challenges for
cause.81 In order to avoid this problem, trial judges must use ex-
plicit criteria at each step in the decision making process. These
criteria must protect the valid exercise of peremptory challenges
while guarding against discriminatory abuse. The first step in
this process is to decide what is required to establish a prima
facie case of abuse. California and Massachusetts have adopted
workable requirements.
1. Establishing a Complete and Accurate Record
Wheeler requires that the defendant make a complete rec-
ord of all significant information about the case.83 If the record
is insufficient, the court cannot draw an accurate conclusion, and
any subsequent allegation of abuse will fail." Soares does not
explicitly set out this requirement, but Massachusetts courts
have interpreted Soares to include a complete record require-
ment.85 Thus, a defendant who hopes to successfully challenge
82. See, e.g., Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7 LIGATION 22, 56 (1980);
Cohn & Badillo, supra note 78. (Cohn arguing peremptories would require an oath of
purity of commitment to furthering the quota system or affirmative action, at a
minimum).
83. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 905
(1978).
84. The importance of this step was seen in People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d
526, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1982), a California appellate level decision. Two challenges were
exercised against the only two black members of the venire but the record failed to show
any other information. The court found this bare showing insufficient to establish a
prima facie case and so the challenges were not allowed. Id. at 536-37, 179 Cal. Rptr. at
897.
85. See Commonwealth v. Benbow, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 970, 970, 452 N.E.2d 1164,
1166, appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983). The court stated that a
bare showing of 10 blacks on the venire, prosecutorial challenge of two with four blacks
seated was an inadequate foundation. Id., 452 N.E.2d at 1166. The recent Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruling in Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 391 Mass. 869, 465 N.E.2d 1180
(1984), reinforces this view. In Bourgeois, the defendants alleged abuse based solely on
the surnames of the struck jurors and witnesses. The defendants did not object or create
a record of prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges. Because there were no objec-
tions, the prosecution was denied an opportunity to explain the rationale for the chal-
lenges. Thus, the court ruled that "[a] record in which a party has not had an opportu-
nity to explain the use of peremptory challenges is inadequate to raise a Soares
15
PACE LAW REVIEW
the prosecutor has an obligation to establish which cognizable
group is allegedly being systematically struck and to note all
other pertinent data. In this way, the trial judge can make an
informed decision, and an appellate court will have an adequate
record for appellate review.
The defendant must also object in a timely fashion."' A re-
cent California decision has interpreted "in a timely fashion" to
mean as early as possible so that all parties are put on notice
regarding which subsequent challenges may give rise to a motion
alleging systematic exclusion. 7 The requirements of a complete
record and an early motion promote efficient and economic ad-
ministration of justice by permitting the court, if it finds dis-
crimination, to dismiss the panel and begin again at an early
stage. This approach helps repudiate the concern that objection
to peremptory challenges will drastically lengthen and compli-
cate trials. Finally, early notice and, if necessary, dismissal of
the panel, help the court to achieve the most fair and correct
result at both the trial and the appellate levels. 8 California ap-
plied this approach successfully in the recent case of People v.
Walker.8 9 The defendant made his motion early, and the court
and prosecution took careful notes. The result was an accurate
record for an appellate court to review."
2. Limiting the Cognizable Groups
The second step in establishing a prima facie case requires a
showing that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable
group within the meaning of the representative cross-sectional
violation." Id., 465 N.E.2d at 1186-87.
86. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
87. People v. Ortega, 156 Cal. App. 3d 63, 66, 202 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661-62 (1984).
Early notice facilitates the moving party in preparing the best prima facie case, helps the
prosecution in making the best defense possible, and alerts the court so it can make an
intelligent ruling. Id., 202 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
88. Id.
89. No. AO 18763 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 1984) (available Aug. 15, 1984, on LEXIS,
States library, Cal file).
90. Id. Because there was a complete record, the reviewing court was able to deter-
mine that the trial judge understood and discharged his obligation to evaluate the prose-
cutor's challenges and that substantial evidence supported the court's determination that
the prosecutor sustained the burden of justification. Id.
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rule. ' A proper test must include groups that need protection
without unduly expanding the list of cognizable groups. Al-
though critics have argued that defendants will quickly seek to
expand the list of cognizable groups, 92 there is no reason to as-
sume that the definition of cognizable groups should be any
broader in the peremptory challenge area than it is in other ar-
eas. In fact, neither California nor Massachusetts has shown any
inclination to expand the groups in this area beyond those
groups traditionally recognized.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Soares limited the
definition to groups included in the Massachusetts Equal Rights
Amendment." Thus, the court held that group affiliation based
on sex, race, color, creed, or national origin may not form the
basis for jury exclusion.9 Under this rule, age is not a cognizable
group. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Wood," when the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court recently determined that a trial court had
disallowed peremptory challenges of elderly women based on age
rather than sex, it was reversible error and the court ordered a
new trial."
The California Supreme Court found it necessary to set
guidelines for the "cognizable groups" it had recognized in
Wheeler. Because Wheeler involved the exclusion of black per-
sons, the court did not define groups in that case.9 In Rubio v.
Superior Court of San Joaquin City," the California court
stated that two requirements must be met in order to qualify a
group as "cognizable" for purposes of the cross-section rule. The
requirements are:
First, its members must share a common perspective arising from
their life experience in the group, i.e., a perspective gained pre-
cisely because they are members of that group . . . . The party
... must also show that no other members of the community are
91. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 490, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979). See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
92. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 78.
93. Soares, 377 Mass. at 488-89, 387 N.E.2d at 516. See MASS. CONST. art. I, § 106.
94. Soares, 377 Mass. at 488-89, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
95. 389 Mass. 552, 451 N.E.2d 714 (1983).
96. Id., 451 N.E.2d at 721.
97. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
98. 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
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capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group
assertedly excluded. 9
There has been no deviation from these general require-
ments regarding cognizable groups in the peremptory challenge
cases. In fact, successful Wheeler challenges have all dealt with
blacks. 100 Thus, the critics' concern that the list of cognizable
groups would be improperly expanded has not materialized.
3. Distinguishing Challenges for Group Association from
Challenges for Specific Bias
The third step in establishing a prima facie case is to show a
likelihood that the jurors are being challenged because of group
association rather than because of any specific bias. Specific bias
was defined by the Wheeler court as "a bias relating to the par-
ticular case or trial or the parties or witnesses thereto."1"1 A spe-
cific bias cuts across all segments of society and so does not sig-
nificantly skew the population mix of the venire in any one
direction. 02 Group bias, on the other hand, exists when a prose-
99. Id. at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737. Rubio rejected the claim that
resident aliens were a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-
section rule. In the recent plurality decision of People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d
433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984), the court questioned, without deciding, the validity of the
second part of the Rubio test. The court commented:
The validity of the second part of the Rubio test is questionable, since the consti-
tutional rule requiring a representative jury bars not only the exclusion of a group,
but disproportionate reduction in its members; if some persons with a particular
life experience are barred from the jury, others cannot properly represent the per-
spective of those excluded because the number of persons with that perspective
will be disproportionately small.
People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d at 441 n.51, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 790 n.51.
100. See People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983);
People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978); People v.
Holley, 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1983); People v. Fuller, 136 Cal. App. 3d
403, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1982); People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 454 (1979). In People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979), for
example, the defendant argued that the group excluded was comprised of less educated,
young adults, blue collar workers, and households with family incomes less than $15,000.
Id. at 95, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 743. In refusing to recognize this group, the court stated that
"Rubio supports our view that Wheeler did not relax the definition of cognizability with
respect to groups that are not delineated by either race, sex, ethnicity or religion in such
a manner as to require a different result in the case at bar." Id.
101. Wheeler, 22 Cal. at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
102. As the Wheeler court stated:
[B]oth blacks and whites may have prior arrests, both rich and poor may have
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/6
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cutor decides to exclude all blacks or all Catholics, for example,
because of stereotyped attitudes about how these groups will
think and react. 105
In distinguishing challenges for group association from chal-
lenges for specific bias, it is vital to set a standard that is not
easily circumvented. California and Massachusetts have avoided
this problem by suggesting several factors that the trial judge
can consider to make a decision.1 " The first of these factors is
whether "most or all the members of the identified group" have
been struck from the venire.106
In analyzing this factor, the cases involving systematic ex-
clusion at the venire stage provide a comparison. In these cases
the defendant must show that the representation of a particular
group is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community. These cases rely on numbers to
establish a prima facie case. In Duren v. Missouri,'" for exam-
ple, the petitioner established that fifty-four percent of the
adults in the community were women while only fourteen and
one-half percent of the persons on the weekly venires were
women.10 7 The Supreme Court held that such an imbalance vio-
lated the representative cross-section requirement of Taylor.108
Applying this approach to the peremptory challenge area, com-
position of the venire and the jury actually chosen is compared.
been crime victims, both young and old may have relatives on the police force,
both men and women may believe strongly in law and order, and members of any
group whatever may alienate a party by bare looks and gestures.
Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
103. Id.
104. People v. Wheeler, 22 CaL 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 481, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979).
105. Id. In Soares, the court noted:
One need not eliminate 100% of minority jurors to achieve an impermissible pur-
pose. If the minority's representation is reduced to "impotence," as, for example,
by the challenge of a disproportionate number of group members, and the failure
to challenge only a minority member who can reasonably be relied on as "safe,"
the majority-identified biases are likely to meet with little resistance, and the rep-
resentative cross section requirement is not fulfilled.
Soares, 377 Mass. at 488 n.32, 387 N.E.2d at 516 n.32 (citing Kuhn, Jury Discrimina-
tion: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 235, 281 n.213 (1968).
106. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
107. Id. at 362.
108. Id. at 364-67.
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In Commonwealth v. Walker,109 the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts seemed to take this approach in reviewing a case in
which five out of seven blacks were eliminated from the venire.
The court found that the exclusion of five out of seven blacks in
Walker was a less compelling showing than the exclusion of
twelve out of thirteen blacks in Soares."0 Furthermore, the
court noted that a higher percentage of blacks actually served on
the jury than were in the original venire interviews. 1 '
With peremptory challenges, however, reliance on numbers
alone is not a sufficient basis upon which to make decisions. In
case by case determinations, the courts cannot rely on the kind
of statistical data that has been amassed in the venire composi-
tion area.12 Recognizing this problem, Wheeler articulated addi-
tional factors that are relevant to an inquiry into peremptory
misuse. These factors include: (1) whether the defendant is a
member of the excluded group while the victim is a member of
the minority; (2) whether the voir dire was desultory; and (3)
whether the jurors in question share only one characteris-
tic - their membership in the cognizable group - and that in
all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as
a whole."'
In the California case of People v. Fuller,"4 an appellate
court examined these factors and held that the prosecution had
misused its peremptory challenges." 5 The court emphasized,
however, that no one factor was essential to this determination.
Thus, it proceeded with its inquiry even though the defendant
109. 379 Mass. 297, 397 N.E.2d 1105 (1979).
110. Id. at 301, 397 N.E.2d at 1108.
111. Id. In another case, a defendant claimed peremptory abuse when two blacks
were challenged. The appellate court, however, found that three blacks did sit on the
jury so the likelihood that the other two were kept off because of race was slight. See
Commmonwealth v. Kelly, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 847, 406 N.E.2d 1327 (1980). See also Com-
monwealth v. Benbow, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 970, 452 N.E.2d 1164, appeal denied, 390
Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983) (in which 10 blacks were on venire, the prosecutor
challenged four, the defendant challenged two, and two, both women, were seated on the
jury); Commonwealth v. Clark, 378 Mass. 392, 393 N.E.2d 296 (1979) (holding that ex-
cluding the only black did not constitute systematic exclusion).
112. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 278-80, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05. See
supra text accompanying note 60.
113. Id. at 278-80, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
114. 136 Cal. App. 3d 403, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1982).
115. Id. at 407-08, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
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and the victim were of the same race." 6 Nevertheless, the court
found a significant racial overtone because the participants were
all black, but the jury was all white.1 17 The court also found that
the voir dire was desultory, but emphasized that this factor was
not essential. " 8 The court indicated that the prosecutor should
have asked more probing questions to elicit specific bias, be-
cause aside from race, the challenged jurors appeared as hetero-
geneous as the community as a whole. " 9
The dissenting judge argued that the majority was ignoring
the rule that "'when two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' "120 More-
over, the dissent strongly disputed the majority's finding of
group overtones and argued that the voir dire questioning of the
three blacks was at least as extensive and probing as that of
their white counterparts.1 2' He maintained that this decision
would lead to "a sort of inverse discrimination" in which a pros-
ecutor would rarely exercise a peremptory challenge against a
minority person, fearing that an appellate court would find an
inference of group bias and declare a mistrial.' 22
Fuller was a difficult case to decide. The numbers were
small and reasonable judges viewed the facts differently. The
case illustrates that decisions under Wheeler and Soares are not
always straightforward. Ambiguity alone, however, is an insuffi-
cient justification for retaining the "simpler" Swain test. Fuller
also demonstrates the critical role of the trial judge, who must
consider all of the factors, both tangible and intangible, in mak-
ing a decision. The supreme courts of California and Massachu-
setts, however, have both expressed confidence in the trial
judge's ability to make difficult determinations based on their
experience and knowledge of local conditions and prosecutors.' 3
116. Both the defendant and the victim were black.
117. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
118. Id. at 419-20, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94.
119. Id. at 420, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (citing Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at
764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905).
120. Id. at 426, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (Elkington, J., dissenting) (quoting Grainger v.
Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 807, 313 P.2d 848, 850 (1957)).
121. Id. at 428, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
122. Id.
123. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Soares, 377
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The emerging case law in California and Massachusetts in-
dicates that the Wheeler/Soares framework provides a workable
approach for establishing a prima facie case of abuse on a case
by case basis. The standard is high enough to prevent all pe-
remptory challenges from becoming challenges for cause, while
at the same time enabling an individual defendant to establish a
prima facie case when the facts suggest peremptory abuse. The
California and Massachusetts decisions permit defendants to al-
lege abuse on a case by case basis - an approach that is prefer-
able in light of the constitutional considerations.
B. Rebutting the Prima Facie Case
In addition to the difficult task of defining a prima facie
case, there are problems that occur in setting guidelines for the
successful rebuttal of a prima facie case. First, there is the prob-
lem of determining what constitutes a "sufficient" reason, be-
cause many reasons may actually disguise other motives based
on group bias.124 Second, there is the problem that judges may
accept any explanation given, no matter how implausible. The
California Supreme Court has shown its concern for these
problems by stating that it "must be sensitive not only to the
probability of disingenuousness on the part of the prosecution in
its explanation of challenges, but also to the possibility of in-
genuousness or alacrity on the part of the trial court in its ac-
ceptance of those explanations. '12' Both of these concerns ad-
dress the issue of what explanations or other proof will rebut a
prima facie case of discrimination.
Inevitably, a burden is once again placed upon the trial
court judge, and it is essential that the judge reasonably and sin-
cerely evaluate the explanations offered. People v. Hall12' illus-
Mass. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
124. Professor Younger states that prosecutors will quickly find their tongues and
come up with sufficient explanations even though these explanations might disguise un-
derlying purposes. See Younger, supra note 82, at 56.
125. People v. Clay, 153 Cal. App. 3d 433, 200 Cal. Rptr. 269, 279 (1984).
126. 139 Cal. App. 3d 829, 189 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1983). The appellant in this case
argued that race was the only common characteristic shared by the struck jurors and
that the struck jurors had never been directly questioned. He also pointed out that the
defendant was black while the victim was white, and that the first trial had ended in a
mistrial because one black juror caused a hung jury. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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trates this need. The appellant contended that the prosecutor
had excluded four black jurors solely on racial grounds to pro-
duce an all-white jury. The prosecutor offered several reasons
for his peremptory challenges. For one juror, the explanation in-
cluded the fact that the juror was from Texas, where the defen-
dant had some contact, and that the juror had a son the same
age as the defendant. The prosecutor explained that another ju-
ror was struck because he kept himself distant from the others
and never smiled during light moments. The trial judge found
that these reasons successfully rebutted the prima facie case.
The appellant argued that the judge erred in not going "behind
the reasons the prosecutor gave," and in effect, accepting any
reason that was offered. 127
The appellate court held that the trial judge had adequately
distinguished bona fide reasons from sham excuses and con-
cluded that there was no error."2 8 Judge Poche dissented, argu-
ing that the trial judge could never accurately assess the reasons
in this case because his premises were incorrect. 129 In examining
the trial court record, Judge Poche found the trial judge be-
lieved he should disallow challenges only if the prosecutor an-
nounced his intent to exercise them on racial grounds. Further-
more, the trial judge had stated that he would accept any
reason, even if he thought it was fallacious.180
Judge Poche's position regarding the nature and extent of
the trial court's duty of inquiry was ultimately upheld by the
California Supreme Court.' 3 ' The court held that the exclusion
of five out of eight blacks clearly established a prima facie case
and that the trial court did not understand its Wheeler obliga-
tion to inquire into the reasons offered by a prosecutor for his
challenges. 82
Hall indicates that the trial judge must understand the new
127. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
128. Id.
129. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 (Poche, J., dissenting).
130. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 237. In Wheeler, the Supreme Court had stated that the
offending party must satisfy the court that the challenges were exercised on grounds
"reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial." Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d
at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
131. See People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983).
132. Id. at 168, 672 P.2d at 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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standard before it can be used to eliminate peremptory abuse.
But even if this first stage is reached, both the judge and the
prosecutor have additional responsibilities. To sustain his bur-
den of justification, the prosecutor "must satisfy the court that
he exercised his peremptories on grounds that were reasonably
relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or wit-
nesses."' 13 3 The prosecutor also has a legal and ethical responsi-
bility to seek justice and to offer only truthful reasons for exer-
cising peremptory challenges.'34 The trial judge must then
determine whether the prosecutor has met his burden. The
judge's role is not a passive one. He should take notes during the
voir dire so that he can compare the prosecutor's explanations
with his own evaluations. When this approach is taken, the final
decision is based on a factual record rather than vague recollec-
tions. It also provides a clear record for appellate review.
The benefits of this factual approach were seen in the re-
cent case of People v. Walker. 3 5 In Walker, defense counsel
made a Wheeler motion noting that four out of five of the prose-
cutor's challenges had been against blacks. The judge denied the
motion as premature but began taking notes. Later, when seven
blacks had been removed and when the prosecutor was called
upon to provide explanations, the judge was able to declare him-
self satisfied that there had been no systematic exclusion of
blacks.3 6 When the appellate court reviewed the case, it was
able to examine a complete record to determine whether the
trial judge understood his obligation. Unlike Hall, in Walker the
appellate court found that the trial judge had made a "sincere
and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's
133. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
134. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d at 169 n.11, 672 P.2d at 859 n.11, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 76 n.11. See
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-13 (1979), which states that
"[t]he responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his
duty is to seek justice not merely to convict."
135. No. AO 18763 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 1984) (available Aug. 15, 1984, on
LEXIS, States library, Cal file).
136. Id. The trial judge stated his understanding of several of the challenges, while
asking the prosecutor to justify those he questioned. The prosecutor indicated that one
of these questioned jurors stood out as a "comic," and the trial judge agreed. Another
juror had been convicted of bribery, another had been seen standing among friends of
the defendant, and another was excluded out of fear of empathy between her and a
potential alibi witness. Id.
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explanations. ' '137
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the prosecutor
had successfully rebutted the prima facie case. The court em-
phasized that: (1) the prosecutor had passed the jury twice while
there were blacks; (2) four jurors were excused on grounds rea-
sonably related to the case on trial; (3) the judge apparently
agreed with the dismissal of two jurors; and (4) the lack of recol-
lection by the prosecutor, regarding one juror who was elimi-
nated before the prosecutor was placed on notice, was
acceptable. 8'
Walker demonstrates that strict formulas cannot be applied
under the Wheeler/Soares test. A common sense approach, how-
ever, coupled with the guidelines set out in Wheeler and Soares
leads to just results. Walker also demonstrates that a prima fa-
cie case can be successfully rebutted by a prosecutor with rea-
sons relevant to the case. As judges become more familiar with
the new tests and better understand their own responsibilities,
they can provide an essential and positive influence in making
this approach successful.
IV. Conclusion
Swain v. Alabama""9 established an almost insurmountable
burden for overcoming the presumption that in any particular
case the prosecution is using its peremptory challenges to obtain
a fair and impartial jury. A majority of the Supreme Court has
recognized that the approach adopted in Swain raises compel-
ling constitutional issues.140 The Court should not wait for the
states to provide guidance before requiring a case by case ap-
proach. The experience of the California and Massachusetts
courts provides practical insight into the effects of a case by case
approach. The cases in those states show that, although their
systems are not perfect, instances of glaring abuse have clearly
137. Id. (quoting People v. Hall, 135 Cal. 3d at 167, 672 P.2d at 858, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 75). The appellate court quoted, with approval, the trial judge's statement regarding
Wheeler. "I look at Wheeler as really not setting up very technical criterion (sic) but
rather what they look for, and that's the exclusion of groups and that I should use my
common sense in whether or not I think that's been done." Id.
138. Id.
139. 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
140. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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been eliminated. These states are operating under a workable
alternative to Swain. There has been no deluge of frivolous
cases; most of the time peremptory challenges are exercised in
their normal manner. Furthermore, each step in the process pro-
vides protection for the valid exercise of peremptory challenges
with reasonable tests for both establishing and rebutting a prima
facie case of discrimination while protecting constitutional inter-
ests. Difficult decisions must, of course, be made by the trial
judges, but this is true in many procedural and substantive areas
of the law. Use of peremptory challenges should not continue to
take precedence over the right to an impartial jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community. It is time to place
peremptory challenges in perspective and limit their potential
for abuse.
Kendra J. Golden
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